Light Squares

Trust Center · Attestable Builds

How to verify an Attestable Build.

A binary usually comes with no proof of its provenance, meaning where it came from and how it was built. Attestable Builds provide this provenance and let anyone verify it. On this page, we walk you through how that verification works, step by step.

Why it matters

Source code can be reviewed, but reading a binary is hard and often infeasible. That is why you need to be able to trust the build server that turns one into the other, because it shapes what ends up in the binary. If attackers break into it, they can hide a backdoor in the binary while the source code stays clean, and reviewing the code will not reveal it. This is how the SolarWinds attack reached thousands of organizations in 2020.

You can read more about why this matters in our post Modern supply chain security needs scalable verifiability.

The journey of a binary

  1. You, the publisher

    1. You build

    You push a commit, and Attestable Builds builds it inside an enclave on an AMD SEV-SNP processor. While the build runs, nobody can tamper with it, including us.

  2. Attestable Builds

    2. You get proof

    Along with the binary, you receive an attestation record that states which commit it was built from. The enclave signs this record, and we add it to a transparency log.

  3. You, the publisher

    3. You ship

    Your users download the binary just as they always have, so nothing changes in how you ship.

  4. Your user

    4. Your user checks

    Seven checks tell your users where the binary came from, and you can try them yourself below.

Now you are the user

Imagine you just received a binary and want to know where it came from. The seven checks below answer that question one by one, using a real build of our own base-kernel as the example.

  1. 1

    You got a binary. Where is it from?

    Drop the file on the verify page. Your browser calculates its fingerprint locally and sends only that fingerprint, never the file itself. The verifier then shows you one attestation record for each build that produced this file.

    Check it yourself. If you would rather not rely on your browser, run this command and compare its output with the fingerprint shown on the verify page.

    sha256sum bzImage
    Go deeper

    The browser computes the SHA-256 of the file. The record is an in-toto statement with SLSA provenance, and its subject list holds the name and SHA-256 digest of every artifact the build produced.

    If no record matches the file, nobody can vouch for where it came from.

    What you see on the verify page

    AttestationSEV-SNPPASSED
    • Source code snapshot

    • Attestation envelope parsed

    • Envelope key matches the attestation report

    • Envelope signature verified

    • Artifact digest matches a subject

      Expected: 1b607be685bfcb78…

      Subject: 1b607be685bfcb78…

    • Transparency log inclusion verified

    • Attestation policy verification

  2. 2

    Which code was it built from?

    The record names the repository and the exact commit that was built. The enclave downloaded this code itself, so it is the version that was actually built. Check that it is the code you expect.

    Check it yourself. Browse the repository at that commit to see exactly which code went into the build.

    Browse the code at this commit →
    Go deeper

    Repository, commit and build entry are the externalParameters of the SLSA provenance. The commit is the one the enclave resolved and checked out. The verifier displays them, and whether this is the source you wanted is for you to decide. The build runs with network access, so base images and packages the Dockerfile downloads are not fixed by the commit. Pin them by digest or exact version.

    If the commit is not the one you expected, the binary was built from different code, even when every other check passes.

    What you see on the verify page

    AttestationSEV-SNPPASSED
    • Source code snapshot

      Repository: https://github.com/lightsquares/base-kernel.git

      Commit: 1a413ae46e5c…

    • Attestation envelope parsed

    • Envelope key matches the attestation report

    • Envelope signature verified

    • Artifact digest matches a subject

    • Transparency log inclusion verified

    • Attestation policy verification

  3. 3

    Has anyone changed the record?

    The record is sealed with a digital signature, and changing even a single character would break that seal. A seal alone, however, does not tell you who made it.

    Go deeper

    An Ed25519 signature over the normalized statement. The key fingerprint is the SHA-256 of the signing public key, which travels with the record.

    If the seal is broken, the record was changed after it was sealed and should not be trusted.

    What you see on the verify page

    AttestationSEV-SNPPASSED
    • Source code snapshot

    • Attestation envelope parsed

    • Envelope key matches the attestation report

    • Envelope signature verified

      Key fingerprint: 9116c70cc45764a6

    • Artifact digest matches a subject

    • Transparency log inclusion verified

    • Attestation policy verification

  4. 4

    Who sealed it?

    Only the enclave that ran the build could have sealed it. The enclave creates a brand-new key when it starts and keeps it locked inside, and the key disappears when the enclave shuts down, so not even we can use it. The processor's signed hardware report contains a value calculated from this key, which ties the seal to this specific enclave.

    Go deeper

    The SEV-SNP report contains 64 bytes of report data that the chip signs. They hold a SHA-512 hash over the enclave's key commitment (itself a SHA-512 over its signing and encryption public keys) plus random values from the job and the host. This ties the report to this enclave's key.

    If the key does not belong to the enclave, anyone could have made this record.

    What you see on the verify page

    AttestationSEV-SNPPASSED
    • Source code snapshot

    • Attestation envelope parsed

    • Envelope key matches the attestation report

      Pubkey: 4945bf12d86247e6…

    • Envelope signature verified

    • Artifact digest matches a subject

    • Transparency log inclusion verified

    • Attestation policy verification

      Policy: snp.json

      SEV-SNP firmware: 1.55

      Verified claims: EnclaveEphemeralKeyCommitted, SnpAttestationFreshnessMatches, …

  5. 5

    Is the processor genuine?

    AMD, not Light Squares, vouches for each of its processors. The report also shows that the processor's security firmware meets our minimum version and that debug mode is switched off.

    Check it yourself. You can fetch AMD's root key directly from AMD and compare its fingerprint with the vendor root key on our reference values page.

    curl -s https://kdsintf.amd.com/vcek/v1/Milan/cert_chain | awk '/BEGIN/{n++} n==2' | openssl x509 -outform der | sha256sum
    Go deeper

    The report is signed with the chip's VCEK. The verifier checks the chain VCEK → ASK → ARK against AMD's pinned root key, that the reported firmware versions (TCB) meet a minimum, that debug mode is off, and that the report came from VMPL 0. The policy allows SMT and does not require TSME. Certificate revocation is not checked.

    If this check fails, the report did not come from a genuine AMD processor, or the processor ran outdated security firmware or had debugging switched on.

    What you see on the verify page

    AttestationSEV-SNPPASSED
    • Source code snapshot

    • Attestation envelope parsed

    • Envelope key matches the attestation report

    • Envelope signature verified

    • Artifact digest matches a subject

    • Transparency log inclusion verified

    • Attestation policy verification

      Policy: snp.json

      SEV-SNP firmware: 1.55

      Verified claims: SnpAttestationChainVerified, SnpAttestationCorrectlySigned, SnpAttestationTcbAtLeast, SnpAttestationIsNotInDebugMode, SnpAttestationVmplIsZero, SnpAttestationPlatformInfo, …

  6. 6

    Was it running the right software?

    When the enclave started, the processor took a fingerprint of its firmware, its kernel and the kernel's settings, which in turn include the fingerprint of the whole disk. This measurement must exactly match our published reference values, which proves that the record was written by the software we published.

    Check it yourself. Coming Once the sources are public, you will be able to rebuild our firmware, kernel and disk yourself, check that you get the same fingerprints, and recompute the boot measurement.

    Go deeper

    The launch digest covers the OVMF firmware, the kernel, the initrd and the kernel command line. The command line contains the dm-verity root hash of the disk image, which must be in the trusted list. Everything the enclave software reports, in the report and in the in-toto statement, is trusted because this measurement proves which software made it. That covers what the enclave observed itself, such as the commit, the artifact digests and the base image dm-verity root. The OVMF and kernel builder dependencies and the builder id are hints passed in by the host. They are signed, so they can't be changed afterwards, but nothing checks them. The real firmware and kernel are checked through the launch measurement instead. ProcessDigestNotInDenyList checks the enclave-manager binary against a deny list that is currently empty.

    If the fingerprints differ, software other than the published one ran in the enclave, and nothing it reports can be trusted.

    What you see on the verify page

    AttestationSEV-SNPPASSED
    • Source code snapshot

    • Attestation envelope parsed

    • Envelope key matches the attestation report

    • Envelope signature verified

    • Artifact digest matches a subject

    • Transparency log inclusion verified

    • Attestation policy verification

      Policy: snp.json

      SEV-SNP firmware: 1.55

      Verified claims: SnpAttestationMatchesLaunchDigest, DmVerityImageMatchesRootHash, VerityHashInTrustedList, ProcessDigestNotInDenyList, VmAttestationCorrectlySigned, VmAttestationFreshnessMatches, VmAttestationIsVm, ProcessAttestationCorrectlySigned, ProcessAttestationFreshnessMatches, …

  7. 7

    Could the record vanish or be swapped?

    Each record is added to a transparency log, a list that can only grow. The verifier checks that your record is in it, so the record cannot be swapped later without the log showing it.

    Check it yourself. Coming Soon you will be able to look up the record in the transparency log yourself.

    Go deeper

    The log is a Merkle tree with signed checkpoints. The verifier checks the checkpoint signature and an inclusion proof that leads from the record's hash to the checkpoint's root hash.

    If the record is not in the log, or the log cannot be reached, do not rely on the record until it shows up there.

    What you see on the verify page

    AttestationSEV-SNPPASSED
    • Source code snapshot

    • Attestation envelope parsed

    • Envelope key matches the attestation report

    • Envelope signature verified

    • Artifact digest matches a subject

    • Transparency log inclusion verified

      Root hash: 5b51c58c35bb9e9d…

    • Attestation policy verification

What a pass means

When all seven checks pass, you know that this exact binary came out of building this exact commit, inside a genuine AMD enclave running our published software.

A pass does not tell you whether the code itself is safe, because a build turns whatever is in the commit into a binary, backdoors included. Checking the code is what Dependency Canary is for. Likewise, anything the build downloads, such as base images or packages, is only as trustworthy as its source, so we recommend pinning those to exact versions.

One trust anchor

Every check leads back either to a single trust anchor, AMD's root key, or to the software our enclaves run. Because the sealing key exists only inside the enclave, we cannot forge a record. Once that software is open source, you will be able to read and rebuild it yourself, and Light Squares drops out of the picture entirely.

The software our enclaves are allowed to run is listed on the reference values page.

Coming We are open-sourcing the verifier and our enclave images and opening the records and the log to everyone, so that you can run and rebuild everything yourself.

Try it with a real build.

Drop a file on the verify page or try our sample build, and compare the result with the steps above.